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ASSESSING THE EVOLUTION AND AVAILABLE
ACTIONS FOR RECOVERY IN CULTURAL PROPERTY
CASES
Joshua E. Kastenberg.
INTRODUCTION
"It Belongs in a Museum" - Indiana Jones.'
Hopefully, recognition when cultural property claims are made, institutions like
the Metropolitan Museum of Art have to, at some point, give up the battle...
and recognize that these objects should be returned to their rightful countries of
origin.
For collectors of antiquities, artifacts, and other cultural property, there is an
increasing concern that a bona fide purchase claim may not be a viable defense
against an action for recovery of ownership from another party such as ethnic
groups, foreign nations or Native American associations or tribes. This concern
is not unfounded. Unlike the purchase of other property, cultural property is a
unique category, requiring different consideration from normal recovery laws.
For individuals or parties seeking the return of cultural property, there are a
variety of useful legal actions for recovery of cultural property. This article neu-
trally examines the federal and state actions and analyzes the viability of each
potential law.
In recent years there has been growing legal debate over objects of cultural
importance. A well known example is the argument between Greece and England
over the ownership of the Elgin Marbles, a Greek treasure which England ac-
quired almost two centuries ago Although the laws regarding cultural property4
* Instructor of History, Milwaukee Area Technical College; M.A. 1991, Purdue University;
J.D. 1996, Marquette University Law School. The author wishes to thank Professor Jack Kircher and
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1. Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade (Paramount Pictures 1989).
2. Lawrence Kaye, transcript, Morning Edition, National Public Radio, Sept. 24, 1993. Lawrence
Kaye represented Turkey through the law firm of Herrick, Feinstein, and Herrick in Republic of
Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
3. See Christopher G. Jemigan, Protecting National Treasures in a Single-Market EC, 17 B.C.
INT'L & COw. L. REV. 153 (1994).
4. Cultural property includes, but is not limited to, objects of historic importance such as art,
archaeological artifacts and historic documents.
There has even been the suggestion that the definition of cultural property might expand to
paleontological finds on Indian reservations. See Black Hills Inst. of Geologic Research v. United
States Dept. of Justice, 812 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. 1993). See generally Patrick K. Duffy & Lois A
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differ between the United States and other art-importing nations, the saga of the
Elgin Marbles places the cultural property debate into a current legal perspective.
Many issues surround the validity of Greek claims over the Marbles. There
are literally hundreds of legal questions involved in the debate over rightful
ownership. For example, officers of the British Museum have suggested that the
Ottoman authorities who handed over the rights to the Marbles were the lawfully
recognized government of Greece;5 therefore, Lord Elgin acquired the Marbles
legally.6 These same museum officials have also argued that the Greek claim
fails the statute of limitations requirement.7 In the United States, however, these
same defenses are considered irrelevant. This fact uniquely sets the United States
apart from other art-importing countries.
United States laws regarding antiquities are not settled, but an historic legal
overview provides some guidance to the direction of cultural property claims.
These laws gain importance with the realization that art is second only to narcot-
ics in worldwide illegally trafficked items.' Furthermore, there is an abundance
of disputed cultural property within legitimate interests, such as museums and
personal collections. Thus, before taking an overview of current legal protections,
it may be helpful to briefly examine two current controversies.
The two most recent controversies involve the Metropolitan Museum of Art,
The Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, and The Republic of Turkey.9 In Septem-
Lofgren, Jurassic Farce: A Critical Analysis of the Government's Seizure of "Sue," A Sixty-Five-
Million-Year-Old Tyrannosaurus Rex Fossil, 39 S.D. L. REV. 478 (1994). Although the Department
of Justice eventually abandoned this claim, they originally argued that the Antiquities Act of 1906
applied. Also, paleontological resources as cultural property is mentioned in the UNESCO Conven-
tion on the Prevention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.
Finally, there is a suggestion that information such as photo copies and photographs of national
treasures are in the protected class of cultural property. See Biblical Archaeology Soc. v. Qimron,
1993 WL 39572 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 1993).
5. See, e.g., Michael Binyon, Greece Opens Its Arms To Venus, TIMES (London), Jul. 4, 1994, at
1. "Britain has always insisted that the frieze, now housed in the British Museum, was legally pur-
chased."
6. Id.
7. John H. Merryman, Thinking About the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1881 (1986).
Merryman argues that
Greece has accordingly been in a position to sue for the Marbles since 1828 and has never
done so. Nor has Greece aggressively pursued its diplomatic remedies, since the 1983 re-
quest for the return of the Marbles is the first such diplomatic demand. Unless some un-
usual exception were made, it seems clear that the Greeks have lost any right of action
they might have had for the recovery of the Marbles before an English court, where the
applicable statute of limitations is six years.
Id. at 1882.
8. In 1986, the International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR), a New York-based non-profit
organization founded to curtail trafficking stolen art and assisting in art authentication, reported 524
foreign thefts of art, now estimated at $1 billion a year. See generally John Shinn, New World Order
for Cultural Property: Addressing The Failure of International and Domestic Regulation of the Inter-
national Art Market, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 978 (1994).
The international marketplace for art, artifacts, and antiquities is a billion dollar market. See
Heidi Berry, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1990, at 20.
9. See Mark Rose & 6zgen Acar, Turkey's War On The Illicit Antiquities Trade, ARcHAEOLoGy,
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ber, 1993, the Metropolitan returned a "priceless trove" known as the Lydian
hoard to Turkey after a six year legal battle." Metropolitan officials agreed to
settle the claim only after the New York District Court barred a statute of limita-
tions defense in Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art." Currently,
there is a Turkish claim for the upper half of a statue of Herakles owned by the
Museum of Fine Arts in Boston." Initially, museum officials argued that these
statues were numerous and could be found in hundreds of Roman villas from
England to Syria. 3 However, Turkish officials were able to produce the lower
half of the statue in question, which fit evenly at the break.'4 Despite this fact,
the museum has kept the upper haf. 5 Litigation will undoubtedly result, costing
both Turkey and the museum sums of money and lost time before a settlement
occurs. However, the situation for Turkey is not as bleak as it would certainly be
in Northern Europe. If the same facts were applied to a United Kingdom muse-
um, for example, one can hardly begin to imagine the various defenses raised. A
British museum would undoubtedly argue both the statute of limitations defense
and that Lydia became an extinct civilization over a millennium before the Turks
even populated Asia Minor. While in Britain, these arguments alone would
preclude a Turkish claim, the same defenses would be barred in the United
States. The reasons for such a bar come to light when the past century of laws
and legal remedies surrounding cultural property are examined.
March/April 1995, at 44.
10. Daniel Hays, Returning the Booty: Turkey Gets Back Hundreds of Priceless Artifacts,
REUTERs NEWS SERvicE, Sept. 22, 1993, at 12 (quoting Philip de Montebello, the museum director
who issued a statement that the decision to settle the lawsuit came immediately after Turkey present-
ed evidence that much of the collection was stolen "only months before the museum acquired it.").
11. Republic of Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In
Republic of Turkey, the court based its conclusion on the earlier decision of Guggenheim Found. v.
Lubell, 550 N.Y.S.2d 618 (App. Div. 1990), where the court held that the "unreasonable delay" re-
quirement in a statute of limitations defense applied only to the equitable defense of laches. Cultural
property, in both Republic of Turkey and Guggenheim, does not fall under a laches aegis because the
discovery laws do not begin to toll until the plaintiff recognizes where the materials are located.
Thus, the court held that the delay was not unreasonable.
12. Rose & Acar, supra note 9, at 48.
13. Id.
14. Id. Turkish officials unearthed the lower half of the statue in 1974.
15. Id. The Museum's director, Robert P. Mitchell, argued:
The museum does not acknowledge Turkey's claim to ownership. There has never been
any evidence that the statue was stolen, and allegations to that effect were entirely unsup-
ported. ... Indeed the break between the top and bottom halves appears to be an ancient
one, such that the top half could have been removed long ago from the territory that is
now known as Turkey.
16. See generally H.W.F. SAGGS, THE MIGHT THAT WAS ASSYRIA (1984) (discussing a general
overview of ancient civilizations in Asia Minor); see also H.W.F. SAGGS, THE GREATNESS THAT
WAs BABYLON (1988).
The British might argue that a direct historic relationship is necessary to prove cultural proper-
ty. Since Asia Minor has been occupied by the Assyrian, Bronze Age Greek, Roman, Byzantine, and
Turkish civilizations since the fall of Lydia, an argument that no direct relationship exists may have
merit. Nonetheless, as will be seen in the following section, such a defense would not be valid in a
United States court.
1995]
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In Section I, the overview of federal laws provides guidance to sovereign
entities seeking a legal claim over cultural property. In addition, Section I exam-
ines the evolution of United States federal law in the cultural property context.
This will provide a plaintiff with a clearer picture of recovery actions under U.S.
federal law. Furthermore, Section II presents an argument for why standard state
replevin laws are less costly and more efficient than the U.S. federal statutes.
I. A SuRvEY OF UNITED STATES LAWS
A. American Antiquities Act of 1906
In 1906, Congress realized the importance of safeguarding potential national
treasures on federal lands by passing the American Antiquities Act. 7 The Act
provided a blanket set of protections and penalties which were intended to be a
stiff deterrent to pilfering and smuggling artifacts."8 However, the Antiquities
Act did not extend beyond federal lands. In fact, it was not even enforced until
the 1970s because of complaints of pilfering from Indian lands. 9 In the 1974
decision United States v. Diaz, ° the Ninth Circuit held that the Antiquities Act
was unconstitutionally vague for failing to define terms such as "ruin" and "mon-
ument."2
The Diaz decision is open to criticism on two grounds. First, there had al-
ready existed legal definitions for "ruin," "antiquity," "relic," "artifact" and
"monument." The court needed only to look to the few Internal Revenue casesp
for this terminology. Second, five years after Diaz, in United States v. Smyer,'
the Tenth Circuit rejected the "fatally vague" argument. After reviewing
Webster's New International Dictionary,24 the court held that "[a] ruin is the
remains of something which has been destroyed," and antiquity refers to "times
long since past."' Thus, either the courts or Congress had the task of clarifying
the Antiquities Act or superseding it with another.
17. Pub. L. No. 103-325 (1906) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1910)).
18. Id. The Antiquity Act holds that any person appropriating, excavating, injuring, or destroying
any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity, situated on federal lands,
without permission, was to be fined no more than $500 or imprisoned for ninety days, or both.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 114-15. ("The statute does not limit itself to Indian Reservations or to Indian Relics.
Hobbyists who explore the desert and its ghost towns for arrowheads and antique bottles could argu-
ably find themselves within the Act's proscriptions.").
22. See, e.g., In Re Chester Tripp, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1225, (1963) (defining "antiquity" and
"ruin" as "artifacts valued by their significance and age").
23. United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1979).
24. WEBsTER's NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1173 (3d ed. 1972).
25. Smyer, 596 F.2d at 941. The defendants had visited the sites on several occasions and con-
sulted with an archaeologist. Therefore, the defendants' claim of the law not providing a clear defini-
tion of "antiquity" was dubious. Judge Breitenstein distinguished Smyer from Diaz, because Diaz
involved newly created cultural property. In Diaz, expert anthropologists argued that an "artifact"
could have a wide range of ages, from yesterday to the beginnings of time. Diaz, 499 F.2d at 114.
[Vol. VI:39
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B. Historic Sites Act of 1935
In 1935, Congress passed the Historic Sites Act (HSA)26 to identify and
evaluate properties of national historic significance. Under the HSA, Congress
declared that "it is a national policy to preserve for public use historic sites,
buildings, and objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of
the people of the United States."'  The HSA gave the 1906 Antiquities Act
greater breadth by allowing the Secretary of the Interior to designate properties
for protection and preservation, fulfilling one of the purposes listed in the 1906
Act.2" This designation of properties was to be accomplished through coopera-
tion with state governments, municipal subdivisions, private organizations, and
qualified individuals interested in the preservation of historic buildings, sites, and
property connected with a public use.29
In addition, the HSA introduced the concept of a National Register, where the
historic properties would be listed for the benefit of the public, particularly pur-
chasers and historians.' Moreover, in 1936, at the time the HSA was enacted,
the Act worked well into President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal. Since
U.S. economic expansion had slowed, and the HSA would need more employees
in order to identify and evaluate properties of national historic significance, the
Act would increase employment opportunities, which was the goal of FDR's
New Deal.3 However, the HSA has been criticized for failing to protect and
repatriate Native American graves, sites and other objects.32
Soon after the passage of the HSA, in Barnridge v. United States,33 the
Eighth Circuit had to determine the scope of the Act's authority. In Barnridge,
the Secretary of the Interior determined that a privately owned site in St. Louis,
26. Pub. L. No. 89-249, 79 Stat. 971 (1935) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 462-67 (1937)).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1988).
28. ROBERT B. McKINSTRY, JR., Er AL., SPEcIAL PLACES, SPECIAL RULES: THE PLACE OF
NEPA, SEPAS, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE FEATURES IN REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL SOL-
ID WASTE, C355 ALI-ABA 79, at 147-48 (1988).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 462(e) (1994).
30. Protection of Historic and Cultural Properties, 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a)(l)(i) (1992). Factors con-
sidered for inclusion of a property into the National Register are as follows:
The quality of significance in American History, architecture, archaeology, engineering,
and culture is present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects, that possess
integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association, and:
(a) that are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad
patterns of our history; or
(b) that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or
(c) that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction,
or that represent a significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack indi-
vidual distinction; or
(d) that have yielded or may be likely to yield, information important in pre-history or
history.
31. See REXEORD G. TUGWELL, F.D.R.: ARCHITECT OF AN ERA (1967).
32. June Camille Bush Raines, One is Missing, Native American Graves Protection and Repatri-
ation Act: An Overview and Analysis, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 639, 649 (1992).
33. Barnridge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295 (8th Cir. 1939). 5
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Missouri, had value as a historic site, and therefore, he instituted proceedings to
condemn the property. This action by the Secretary of the Interior was
challenged by the owners of the property when they contended that the HSA did
not give the Secretary of the Interior the power to condemn private properties.34
The Eighth Circuit, however, decided that the federal government did indeed
possess condemnation power for the purposes of acquiring real estate under the
HSA's auspices. 5
Although the HSA covered properties in existence, the Act did not provide an
enforcement mechanism to stop the future rapid growth of suburbs in the post
World War II era. In fact, in the post-war era, suburbs and industry grew expo-
nentially.36 As a result, federal agencies were substantially unable to stop the
degradation of historic sites with historic preservation laws. Therefore, in order
to remedy this gap in the legislation, the Lyndon Johnson administration ad-
dressed anew the problems of historic preservation and protection of objects of
historical significance.
C. National Historic Protection Act
The National Historic Protection Act (NHPA) 7 was passed by Congress in
1966. While the NHPA does not directly affect the nation's cultural property
laws, it provides some guidance behind congressional intent to salvage the
nation's history by protecting sites of historic significance. At the height of the
Cold War, President Lyndon Johnson sought to create a balance between the
need to preserve history and the demands to further industrial progress. 3 How-
ever, the courts have seen this balance as a purely environmental concern, rather
than an issue of cultural property ownership.39 For example, in Pennsylvania
Central v. New York City,' the Court gave vitality to the historic preservation
movement when it held that preservation laws related to the promotion of the
34. Id.
35. Id. at 297. Furthermore, because the HSA gave authorization for the Secretary of the Interior
to acquire property for the purposes of the Act, the court held that the federal government could
acquire by eminent domain, or otherwise, sites of national historic importance to preserve them "to
commemorate and illustrate the nations history." Id. at 299. See generally Mary Phelan, Synopsis of
Laws Regarding Cultural Property, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 66 (1993).
36. Congress argued that "the HSA failed to stop the accelerated loss of the historic built environ-
ment, especially in areas of urban renewal and road construction which dominated the post World
War II landscape in the 1950's." H.R. REP. No. 1457, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1980) (reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6378, 6380-81).
37. Pub. L. No. 94-422, Stat. 1313, 1319-23 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 (a)-(w)(6) (1967)).
38. See generally ROBERT DvNE, THE JOHNSON YEARS (1987); see also FRANK CORMiER, LBJ:
THE WAY HE WAS (1977).
39. In Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the
Court noted that "the problem of [historic preservation] is basically an environmental one, of enhanc-
ing - or perhaps developing for the first time - the quality of life for people." Id. at 108. (citing Gil-
bert, Introduction, Precedents For The Future, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 311, 312 (1971). (quot-
ing address by Robert Stipe, 1971 Conference on Preservation Law, Washington, D.C., May 1, 1971
(unpublished text at 6-7))).
40. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
[Vol. VI:39
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general environmental welfare.4 Moreover, no specific case law regarding cul-
tural property collections evolved from the NHPA, nor has the N-PA provided
any specific protections for artifacts or antiquities. The NHPA is geared more
toward the preservation of landmarks and properties relating to the nation's histo-
ry. However, even in the cultural property context, the NHPA might provide
protection for parties interested in preserving a cultural property, but there are
several bureaucratic problems that the interested party would face.
First, the NHPA is encumbered by lengthy agency enactment procedures
found in its section 106 enforcement and compliance provision.42 Under this
section, all federal agency projects or private development projects requiring
federal agency approval must take into consideration potential harm to historic
sites and objects.43 Second, section 106 administrative procedures are unsettled
because the issues of both agency timeliness and comprehensive study have
never been addressed. For example, in Wilson v. Block,' the D.C. Circuit Court
held, over the objections of a property owner, that an agency did not need to
survey one hundred percent of a site slated for development. In fact, the court
accepted a Forest Service survey of forty percent as acceptable to meet the sec-
tion 106 requirement of comprehensive site assessment.45 Third, section 106
contains a provision that agency determinations can be conducted in a flexible
manner.' Congress gave the Advisory Council a "reasonable time to comment"
on an agency's or private developer's undertakings.47 The Advisory Council, in
turn, interpreted congressional intent in the most flexible manner possible.'
As a result, with the exception of Native American groups, parties interested
41. Phelan, supra note 35, at 68.
42. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4 (1992).
43. Id.
44. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 753-754. This particular case dealt with an archaeologic review where the Forest Ser-
vice had excavated roughly 40% of property to determine any historic or archaeologic significance.
The court held that "partial surveys are sufficient. The regulations do not expressly require agencies
in all cases to fully survey the grounds of all impact areas, and in fact recognize that the need for
surveys will vary from case to case." See 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a)(l)-(2) (1992).
46. H.R. REP. No. 1916, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966) (reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.A.A.N. 3307-
3309). See also Malissa MacGill, Old Stuff is Good Stuff. Federal Agency Responsibilities Under
Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 7 ADmiN. LJ. AM. U. 697 (1994).
47. MacGill, supra note 46, at 699-700.
48. The Code of Federal Regulations provides for a flexible rather than rigid process of agency
determination. 36 C.F.R. § 800.3(c) provides:
Timing: Section 106 process requires the Agency Official to complete the section 106 pro-
cess prior to the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issu-
ance of any license or permit.
The Council does not interpret this language to bar an Agency Official from expend-
ing funds on or authorizing nondestructive planning activities preparatory to an undertak-
ing before complying with section 106, or to prohibit phased compliance at different stag-
es in the planning...
The Agency Official should establish a schedule for completing the section 106 pro-
cess that is consistent with the planning and approval schedule of the undertaking (empha-
sis added).
7
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in the collection and preservation of antiquiies have shied away from using the
NHPA. The NHPA has been used by environmental groups as a defense regard-
ing mining concerns as well as property development. Thus, the NHPA provides
guidance in a cultural property context only to the extent that it embodies some
legislative desire to maintain the nation's history.
D. American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978
Native Americans have cited the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of
1978 (AIRFA)49 as authority for their right to retain their native cultural proper-
ty. 0 Native Americans have asserted that the AIRFA authorizes them to obtain
a return of Indian religious artifacts that are located in a museum collection.'
However, the AIRFA does not contain a provision that museums return religious
artifacts, and the lack of such a provision has proved problematic. For example,
the Zuni Tribe recently requested from the Smithsonian Institution the return of
certain burial artifacts.52 The Zuni representatives believed that the Smithsonian,
as a museum funded mostly by federal funds, had an obligation to return their
artifacts. 3 However, the Zuni's claim was settled out of court and never liti-
gated. As a result, there is no precedent regarding federally subsidized museums.
Moreover, in light of several circuit court decisions, as well as the Supreme
Court decision Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,4 the
courts have ruled that AIRFA is merely a statement of the federal government's
policy that it will recognize the religious beliefs of Native Americans as well as
other groups, but it will not necessarily insist on the return of religious arti-
facts." Furthermore, the courts have not even interpreted the AIRFA as estab-
lishing any new rights.' 6 Therefore, the AIRFA provides little help to Native
American groups seeking to reacquire artifacts via a religious guarantee theory.
49. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1980)).
50. Phelan, supra note 35, at 71.
51. Id.
52. Bowen Blair, Indian Rights: Native Americans Versus American Museums - A Battle For
Artifacts, 7 AM. INDIAN. L. REv. 125 (1980). See also Adele Merenstein, The Zuni Quest For Repa-
triation of the War Gods, 17 AM. INDIAN. L. REv. 589 (1992).
53. Blair, supra note 52, at 126.
54. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
55. See generally Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983);
United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1976).
56. James A.R. Nofziger, The Underlying Constitutionalism of the Law Governing Archaeological
and Other Heritage, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 581 (1994). Nofziger writes that the AIRFA is largely
precatory and thus has had little effect on cultural property laws.
See also Barbara S. Falcone, Legal Protections (Or the Lack Thereof) Of American Indian
Sacred Religious Sites, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 568 (1994). Falcone argues that "[a]lthough the pas-
sage of the AIRFA was definitely a step in the right direction, its very nature as a policy statement
with no cause of action and no enforcement provisions created a hollow promise of religious liberty
for Native Americans." Id. at 572.
[Vol. VI:39
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E. Archaeologic Resources Protection Act
The Archaeologic Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA)57 refined, and
to a large extent, superseded the 1906 Antiquities Act. The ARPA reasserted
federal control over archaeological resources on federal land and provided stiff
penalties to violators. In response to Diaz," Congress provided a definition of
"cultural property" as "any material remains of past human life or activities
which are of archaeological interest and are at least one-hundred years old."59
To date, the ARPA provides the most extensive protection for Native American
cultural property. In fact, the courts have given the ARPA wide latitude rather
than a strict interpretation. For example, in United States v. Gerber,' the Sev-
enth Circuit determined that ARPA extended beyond federal lands and Indian
reservations.6
The Gerber decision is insightful because it demonstrates an application of the
ARPA in a wider context, specifically, that it is not merely relegated to federal
lands in its use. In Gerber, a well known collector of Indian artifacts and a pro-
moter of annual Indian relic shows purchased unearthed artifacts from a con-
struction employee at a General Electric facility in Indiana.62 These artifacts
were uncovered in a large earth mound and eventually constituted the fourth
largest North American artifact find to date.63 Because Gerber's relic shows and
sales activities placed him in a high profile setting, he was eventually arrested
and charged with violating ARPA.' Gerber admitted transporting stolen arti-
facts in interstate commerce and pleaded guilty to misdemeanor violations of
ARPA.
65
Gerber then claimed that despite ARPA's references to state and local law,
ARPA was inapplicable to archaeological objects removed from lands not owned
by either the federal government or Indian tribes.' Judge Posner reasoned that
based on legislative intent, this defense was without merit:
[I]t is almost inconceivable that Congress would have wanted to encourage
amateur archaeologists to violate state laws in order to amass valuable collec-
tions of Indian artifacts, especially as many of these amateurs do not appreciate
the importance to scholarship of leaving an archaeological site intact and undis-
57. Pub. L. No. 96-95, § 2, 93 Stat. 721 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 (aa)-(LL) (1979)).
58. 499 F.2d 113.
59. Pub. L. No. 96-95, § 470(aa).
60. United States v. Gerber, 999 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1993).
61. Id. at 1113. The section of the ARPA that provided the basis of Gerber's conviction was that
"no person may sell, purchase, exchange, transport, receive, or offer to sell, purchase, or exchange, in
interstate or foreign commerce, any archaeological resource excavated, removed, sold, purchased, ex-
changed, transported, or received in violation of any provision, rule, regulation, ordinance, or permit
in effect under State or local law." 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(c). (Congress clearly wanted to avoid the pos-
sible ambiguities of the Antiquities Act.)
62. Gerber, 999 F.2d at 1113.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
1995]
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turbed until the location of each object in it has been carefully mapped to en-
able inferences concerning the design, layout, size, and age of the site, and the
practices and culture of the inhabitants, to be drawn. 7
Thus, as a result of the Gerber decision, ARPA is not only under rigid en-
forcement, but it also provides the widest protection for Native American cultural
property finds to date.
F. The Pre-Columbian Art Act of 1972
Within the last thirty years, ancient pre-Columbian antiquities have become a
major source of investment.' The Pre-Columbian Art Act (PCAA) 6 was the
first peacetime anti-importation law regarding cultural property. The PCAA was
directed at smugglers from South American countries in an attempt to stem the
growing market of Mayan, Incan, and Toltec artifacts. ° Furthermore, the PCAA
requires a certificate from the antiquity's country of origin declaring that the
purchase in that country did not violate any of that country's artifact laws.
However, the PCAA's shortcomings are numerous. First, the PCAA only
provides civil penalties.7! ' Second, procedures under the PCAA can be very ex-
pensive and time consuming.7 Finally, the lack of a criminal penalty un-
doubtedly gives the PCAA minimal deterrence value.73
G. The UNESCO Convention
In 1982, the United States became a full signatory to the UNESCO Conven-
tion on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (UNESCO).7 4 UNESCO took the
unique step of defining cultural property.7' Moreover, this multi-national agree-
67. Id. at 1116. Judge Posner added:
It is also unlikely that a Congress sufficiently interested in archaeology to impose substan-
tial criminal penalties for the violation of archaeological regulations [the maximum penalty
under the ARPA is five years plus a $100,000 fine, § 470ee(d)] would be so parochial as
to confine its interests to archaeological sites and artifacts on federal Indian lands merely
because that is where most of them are.
Id.
68. H.R. REP. No. 3403, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1979). See generally Jameson K. Shedwell, Is
the Lost Civilization of the Maya Lost Forever - The United States and Illicit Trade in Pre-Columbi-
an Artifacts, 24 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 227 (1992).
69. Pub. L. No. 92-587, § 201, 86 Stat. 1297 (1972) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091-95 (1988)).
70. Id. See also Norman Hammond, Toeotihuacan: Art From the City of the Gods, TIMES (Lon-
don), Aug. 5, 1993, at 1.
71. 19 U.S.C. § 2093 (1994).
72. Phelan, supra note 35, at 96.
73. Id.
74. UNESCO Convention, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231, [hereinafter UNESCO].
The United States became a full signatory with the passing of the Cultural Property Implemen-
tation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-446, Title III, § 302, Jan. 12, 1963, 96 Stat. 2351 (codified at 19
U.S.C. § 2601 (1995)).
75. UNESCO covers a wide range of items falling under the definition of "cultural property."
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ment was an attempt to unify international cultural property law. UNESCO was
only the second international agreement enacted during peacetime to protect
national treasures. Unlike the first peacetime agreement (the Pre-Columbian Art
Act of 1972), UNESCO is almost fully international in its coverage.76 However,
there are two noticeable drawbacks to UNESCO in the international sense. First,
some of the wealthier art-importing countries of the world are not signatories. To
date, the United States is one of only three major art-importing countries that is
actually a signatory to the UNESCO convention.77 Second, UNESCO is without
accompanying enforcement provisions in most countries; therefore, it suffers
from a lack of enforcement power in most of the signing nations. As a result,
UNESCO is weakened from a lack of commitment in the international communi-
ty for resolving cultural property issues." However, in the United States,
UNESCO has a greater enforcement power because the United States' commit-
ment to the agreement is paramount. This commitment to UNESCO is reflected
in Metropolitan Museum of Art v. Republic of Turkey,79 in which the court ex-
pressed a desire to see the agreement enforced more often.
Unlike many other signatories to UNESCO, the United States does not claim
an absolute right to its own cultural property. Instead, in 1972, the federal gov-
ernment prohibited only the export of objects illegally removed from federal and
Indian lands. In 1982, Congress ratified UNESCO through the Cultural Property
Implementation Act." This Act, which codified UNESCO into United States
law, provided foreign plaintiffs with a basis for suit. However, even after its
ratification, the United States plaintiffs only claimed property removed from
Among the major provisions, Article 1 provides, in part:
1. ITlhe term "cultural property" means property which on religious or secular grounds, is
specifically designated by each state as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory,
history, literature, art, science, and which belongs to the following categories:
a) rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of
paleontological interest;
b) property relating to history, including the history of science and technology, and
military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, and artists, and to
events of national importance;
c) products of archaeological excavation (including repair and clandestine) or of ar-
chaeological discoveries;
d) elements of artistic or historic monuments or archaeological sites which have been
dismembered;
e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and en-
graved seals ....
823 U.N.T.S. 231.
76. Among the signatories are the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, most of the
Central and South American countries, Egypt, Kenya, and South Africa. See 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
77. The United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Japan are not signatories. And in reality, the Unit-
ed States is the only major art-importing country. Canada and Australia are not large art markets.
These nations do, however, import more than export. See UNESCO Treaty § I; see also Phelan,
supra note 35, at 96.
78. Shinn, supra note 8, at 1005.
79. 762 F. Supp. 44, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
80. 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (1994).
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former Indian lands and federal properties. Thus, the United States is more con-
cerned with illegal import than export of cultural property.
Nonetheless, there are numerous benefits to United States participation in
UNESCO. The United States' enforcement of UNESCO provides the plaintiff
with a more streamlined approach to getting the case to court than the PCAA.
More importantly, United States enforcement of UNESCO can be coupled with
criminal sanctions through its enforcement arm, the National Stolen Properties
Act. Finally, United States involvement in UNESCO shows a commitment to the
international community.
H. National Stolen Properties Act
All international controls, such as UNESCO, are enforceable under the Na-
tional Stolen Properties Act of 1961 (NSPA).' Though the validity of the
NSPA came under scrutiny between 1974 and 1979 in United States v.
Hollinshead,' United States v. McClain (I),'3 and United States v. McClain
(II),"' the power to enforce any international antiquities protection agreement re-
mains unchallenged as a result of the Court's decision in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 5 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court held that the federal
government under the executive branch possesses inherent powers over foreign
relations.8 6 Thus, UNESCO, as is the case with all treaties to which the United
States is a party, is the supreme law of the land. With this legitimacy, the United
States can represent foreign interests and sue for recovery of artifacts by utilizing
the NSPA to enforce the UNESCO agreement.
The NSPA has withstood the "unconstitutionally vague" attack which plagued
the Antiquities Act of 1906.87 In Hollinshead, the defense raised the objection
that "there should be no presumption that an American would understand a for-
eign nation's law."88 However, this defense was discounted due to a number of
factors, the most important factor being that the defendants' actions showed a
knowledge of Guatemalan antiquity law by their clandestine efforts to conceal
the purchase and shipment out of that country. In McClain (1), the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that an unambiguous claim of national ownership by the Mexican gov-
ernment was sufficient grounds to prosecute under the NSPA.9 However, in
81. Pub. L. No. 87-371, § 2, 75 Stat. 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988)).
82. United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974).
83. United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter McClain (I)].
84. United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter McClain (II)].
85. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
86. Id.
87. See text accompanying supra notes 17-25.
88. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d at 1155. This was a dubious claim because the weight of evidence
proved that the defendants knowingly violated Guatemalan law, including the bribing of Guatemalan
customs agents, and the false labeling of the transported stele. Furthermore, Judge Duniway reasoned
that the law under which the defendants were prosecuted was United States law. Guatemalan law
served only to bring the defendants under the NSPA.
89. Id. These factors involved the bribing of customs officials.
90. McClain (I), 545 F.2d at 992.
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McClain (II), the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed its earlier decision, re-
jecting the proposition that unlawful exportation alone renders an artifact stolen
under the NSPA.9" Under the McClain (I) standard, the artifact must be stolen
by the precise definition of the plaintiff nation's laws in order to be protected
under the NSPA.
L Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
Native Americans constitute the oldest civilization in the United States. How-
ever, Congress has only recently recognized the importance of Native American
ownership over cultural property by passing the Native Americans Graves Pro-
tection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) in 1991.92 There are several ideologies
conflicting over the extent of Indian ownership.93 Therefore, it is impossible to
understand the concept of actual ownership without examining the relationship
between Indian law and autonomy, and the United States government.
Although there is an argument that Indian tribes have a special status in the
United States cultural property laws, there is an equally strong argument that
much of the legal power vested in the Indian tribes has eroded over the past two
decades.94 To some extent, during the past two decades, the Court has strayed
from the concept of Indian tribes as "nations within a nation." ' The Court has
even allowed state incursions on reservations, making tribal status as "nations
within a nation" a disappearing basis of law.' Moreover, traditional protection
for Native Americans has eroded in some fundamental aspects, such as religious
protection under the First Amendment.97 Recently, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association," the Court allowed the Department of the
Interior to construct logging roads through Indian Sacred Sites. The Court dis-
missed arguments that: (1) the land itself was a cultural property; and (2) the
Department of the Interior's action constituted an infringement on religious free-
dom as guaranteed both by the First Amendment' and the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act of 1978." Therefore, the federal laws protecting Indian
cultural property claims may have reached a high watermark with no future
91. Shedwill, supra note 68, at 248.
92. Pub. L. No. 101-61, 104 Stat. 3048 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001 (1990)).
93. See generally Blair, supra note 52, at 125; and Falcone, supra note 56, at 568.
94. Michael C. Blumm & Michael Cadigan, The Indian Court of Appeals: A Modest Proposal to
Eliminate Supreme Court Jurisdiction Over Indian Cases, 46 ARK. L. REv. 203 (1993).
95. Id. Since Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the Court has characterized
Indian tribes as independent nations. However, the federal government divested the tribes of their
external sovereignty to conduct foreign diplomacy, to prosecute criminal cases, and under the Indian
Commerce Clause of the Constitution, to regulate commerce with the Indian Tribes. See Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209
(1978); and U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, respectively.
96. Btumm & Cadigan, supra note 94, at 204.
97. Id.
98. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
99. U.S. CoNST. amend. I, cl. 3.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1966 (1984).
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additions. The Court, in light of the Lyng decision, may even permit regression
from the older protections as well.
However, in the event that Indian tribes lose even more traditional protections,
Indian tribes, foreign entities and ethnic groups have a viable alternative to pur-
suing cultural property claims under federal action. The most obvious alternative
rests in the variety of state tort and remedy laws which are more flexible and
easily accessible than their federal counterparts. Moreover, should any party
seeking repossession of a cultural property find any of the above federal laws an
unlikely or difficult action, there remains a clearer cause of action for return in
the form of replevin actions.
Cultural property ownership claims under replevin actions in the state courts
under the individual state replevin laws may be found to be both more efficient
and less expensive than pursuing claims through federal laws. The following
section analyzes three recent ground-breaking cases to prove this point.
II. STATE LAWS: THE VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
A. Autocephalous II
In Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,' the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held in part
that an individual state's replevin laws can be utilized by a plaintiff to recover
cultural property."°2 It is important to examine the facts of Autocephalous II be-
cause of the number of potential defenses that were rendered inapplicable by the
court. First, the choice of legal forum was challenged; second, the defendant
asserted a limitation of actions defense; third, the defendant objected to the
choice of a replevin theory; finally, aspects of international law, such as a second
plaintiff seeking recognition, were asserted.' 3 Autocephalous II leaves the
rightful impression that state laws of replevin are a viable alternative to federal
laws in certain permissible cases. Ultimately, compared to federal laws, it is
more efficient and less costly for a foreign entity to pursue a cultural property
claim under state replevin laws. The facts of Autocephalous II provide a brief
background to the legal issues presented.
In the early sixth century, a large mosaic depicting Jesus Christ as a young
boy on the lap of his mother, the Virgin Mary, was affixed to the apse of the
Church of Panagia Kanakaria ("Kanakaria") in the village of Lythrankomi, Cy-
prus."° Cyprus, an island that had been under foreign occupation from the Ot-
toman Turkish conquest up to independence from Britain in 1960,5 has a col-
orful and complicated history. The two dominant ethnic groups are Cypriot
Greeks, composing three-fourths of the population, and Cypriot Turks, compos-
101. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Autocephalous 11].
102. Id. at 286-87.
103. Id. at 278.
104. Id. at 279.
105. Id. at 280. This period of intermittent occupation is a span of over five hundred years.
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ing the other one-fourth of the population."6 In 1974, as a result of complex
internal and international conditions, the Turkish government invaded Cyprus. To
this day, the island is divided, with the southern portion of the island Greek and
the northern portion Turkish."°7 In 1975, the northern portion of the island
where Lythrankomi is located, formed what became known as the Turkish Feder-
ated State of Cyprus (TFSC).'" In 1983, the name was changed to the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).'" Of the world's nations, only Turkey
has recognized either of these two governments."'
Sometime after the Turkish invasion, there were reports that the ancient Greek
Orthodox churches were being looted and systematically destroyed."' This de-
struction was carried out under the permission of a decree from the TFSC's
occupying government."' In 1979, the recognized government in Southern Cy-
prus received word that the Kanakaria had been vandalized." 3
In 1988, Peg Goldberg, an art gallery owner from Indiana, went to Europe to
shop for her gallery and came into contact with Michel Van Rijn, a Dutch art
dealer."4 Their meetings resulted in the sale and transfer of the Kanakaria mo-
saic in Switzerland."' Goldberg, in later testimony, claimed to have called
UNESCO's office in Geneva, as well as the International Foundation for Art
Research, to "inquire whether there was a claim of record for the mosaics.""..6
There was no information to either prove or disprove her claim to have made
these attempts. Moreover, the lower court pointed out that Goldberg did not
contact either the Republic of Cyprus, the TNRC, INTERPOL, or the Church of
Cyprus." 7 Upon returning home with the mosaics, she advertised their sale in
brochures and by contacting dealers."' Through an American curator, Republic
of Cyprus officials discovered the mosaic's location and requested its return.'
Goldberg refused their request, and the Republic of Cyprus, as well as the
Autocephalous Church of Cyprus, brought suit in the Southern District of Indi-
106. Id.
107. Id. The Turkish invasion led to the forced exodus of over one hundred thousand Greek Cyp-
riots who lived in northern Cyprus.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. The United States, despite its alliance with the Republic of Turkey, has never recognized
either the TFSC or the TRNC governments.
11. Id. at 280-81.
112. Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,
717 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (S.D. Ind. 1989) [hereinafter Autocephalous I] (Government edicts mandat-
ed distinction of religious artifacts... ).
113. Autocephalous II, 917 F.2d at 281.
114. Id. at 281. Van Rijn had a checkered history. He had been convicted in France for forging
Marc Chagall's name on prints, and he claimed to be a descendent of both Rembrandt and Rubens.
Furthermore, Goldberg admitted to knowing these facts about Van Rijn.
115. Id. at 282.
116. Id. at 283.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Initially, Goldberg argued that a Swiss legal forum had jurisdiction.'2 ' How-
ever, the lower court held that Switzerland was an improper choice because "the
Geneva airport, where Goldberg assumed possession of the mosaics - bears little
connection to Cyprus' cause of action."'' 2 The lower court noted the following
facts, to which the Seventh Circuit agreed:
[t]he defendants, those who financed and effected the transfer of the mosa-
ics, and those who now hold the principal monetary interests in the mosaics are
all Indiana citizens; the money used to purchase the mosaics came from an
Indiana bank; the agreement among Goldberg, Fitzgerald, Van Rijn and Faulk
stipulates that Indiana law will apply, indicating Goldberg's reliance on the law
of her own state; and, the mosaics are presently being held in Indiana, where
they have been stored since they entered the United States in July, 1988."
Thus, the following factors are used to determine where jurisdiction is proper. (a)
where the defendants reside; (b) where the purchasing money originates; (c)
where the defendant stipulates a law which will govern the transaction; and (d)
where the cultural property is located.
Goldberg also asserted that Cyprus failed to sue before the running of the
statute of limitations. 24 She relied on two principles of law: (1) that Judge
Noland of the district court "announced a new discovery rule in Indiana; '
arid (2) the Republic of Cyprus failed to exercise due diligence in the pursuit of
its lost treasures.'26 In 1983, a newspaper article had discussed the looting of
Cyprus churches on the Turkish part of the island.2  Goldberg asserted that
Cyprus failed, at that time, to take effective action to stop this activity. How-
ever, the district court concluded that an Indiana court would find that Cyprus'
action was filed in a timely manner because under Indiana's discovery rules,
Cyprus's cause of action did not accrue until Cyprus learned that the mosaics
were in Goldberg's possession.'29 The lower court based its decision on
Kunstsammlugen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon (KZW)'" where a German art gallery,
KZW, sued an American art collector for the return of German paintings that had
disappeared after the Second World War. In KZW, the Second Circuit held that a
cause of action for return of stolen paintings under the control of a bona fide
120. Id.
121. Id. See also Steven F. Grover, The Need For Civil-Law Nations To Adopt Discovery Rules In
Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 TEX. L. REv. 1431 (1992). Switzerland is not a signa-
tory to UNESCO and has very liberal art transfer laws.
122. Autocephalous I, 717 F. Supp. at 1393-94 (following the lex locus situs rule); See generally
Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 How. LJ. 17 (1993).
123. Autocephalous II, 917 F.2d at 287.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 289.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Autocephalous I, 717 F. Supp. at 1388-93.
130. Kunstsammlugen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter KZW].
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purchaser did not accrue until the purchaser refused to comply with the demand
for the return of the paintings. 3' Thus, a statute of limitations defense can suc-
ceed only where (as in the case of the Elgin Marbles) the plaintiff has full
knowledge of the location of the cultural property.
On the issue of a viable remedy theory, the district court held that Cyprus's
request for the return of the mosaic was within the acceptable scope of Indiana
replevin law. 2 Under Indiana replevin law, tle plaintiff must establish three
elements: (1) that the plaintiff holds title or right to possession; (2) that the prop-
erty is unlawfully detained; and (3) that the defendant wrongfully holds posses-
sion.' When analyzing these elements, it was clear to the court that the
Kanakaria Church had right of possession, thereby satisfying the first element.
The request by the Kanakaria Church for Goldberg to return the mosaic, in addi-
tion to Goldberg's refusal, satisfied the second element, the element regarding
the unlawful detention of the property. Furthermore, regarding the third element,
Goldberg continued to wrongfully hold the mosaics in her possession. 4
Goldberg was unable to assert a bona fide purchaser defense because under
Indiana law, a purchaser from a thief has no valid claim of title or right to pos-
session. Indiana follows the common law doctrine of Nemo dat quod non ha-
bet. 'a Thus, no one who traces title through a thief may defeat the ownership
claims of the rightful owner in an action for replevin. Following this reasoning,
the Seventh Circuit again upheld the lower court's finding that Ms. Goldberg
never actually owned the mosaic.'36
Finally, on appeal, Goldberg argued that the district court should have viewed
the TFSC's confiscatory decrees, adopted one year after the Turkish invasion,
and adopted by its successor the TRNC, as de facto laws. 37 The Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's decision not to recognize these laws because the
TFSC and the TRNC were not recognized nations by the United States. 3
There was ample guidance over the recognition issue. For example, in Federal
Republic of Germany v. Elicofon'39 the court held that an agency of the East
German government could not assert a cultural property art claim in an Ameri-
can court because East Germany was not recognized at the time."4
131. Id. at 1161. See also Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.2d 804 (1966).
132. Autocephalous II, 917 F.2d at 290. Under Indiana law, replevin is an action at law "whereby
the owner or person claiming the possession of personal goods may recover such personal goods
where they have been wrongfully taken or unlawfully detained." 25 IND. L. ENCL. Replevin § 1.
133. 25 IND. L. ENCY. Replevin § 42; 917 F.2d at 290.
134. Autocephalous II, 917 F.2d at 291.
135. Collin, supra note 122, at 21. Literally translated, this phrase means that title to property
cannot be transferred through a thief to a third party. Id.
136. Autocephalous II, 917 F.2d at 291.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 293.
139. Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
931 (1974).
140. Id. at 232. Interestingly, on September 4, 1974, the United States formally recognized the
East German government, and the judge vacated his earlier order and allowed the then East Germany
1995]
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Therefore, the necessary elements to establish a claim under state replevin law
are: (1) that the plaintiff has a rightful claim on the cultural property; (2) that the
plaintiff has satisfied the liberal discovery rules against any limitations; (3) that
the party in possession refuses return the property; (4) that the legal forum is
appropriate, which is typically determined by the state in which the cultural
property is located or where the party in possession conducts business; and (5)
that the party in possession has acquired the cultural property in violation of
some jurisdiction's property law. These factors which are endemic to a cultural
property claim present a far less complicated action than pursuit through a feder-
al law, which is continually enmeshed in changing statutory interpretations.
Whether the above mentioned property law is foreign, state, or other, the cause
of action still is considered meritorious.
B. The Legacy of Autocephalous I
Autocephalous II opened the doors, not only to replevin actions under state
law, but it also defined the statute of limitations context in art and antiquity
ownership and theft cases. Furthermore, it established standing to diverse and
foreign entities in federal courts to pursue claims under state law.
Two more recent cases highlight the standards of discovery set forth in
Autocephalous I. In each of the following cases, the district courts determined
that the discovery period could possibly accrue for periods of time extending
beyond what the Autocephalous H decision originally contemplated.
1. Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners
In Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners,'4' the Turkish government brought
suit against possessors of an ancient coin collection which was allegedly smug-
gled out of Turkey. Turkey sought an action under both the Racketeering Influ-
enced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)'42 and the Massachusetts Consumer
Protection Act (MCPA) 143 to obtain the return of the disputed artifacts."M
While RICO is the fundamental conspiracy law in the United States encompass-
ing both criminal and civil actions, the MCPA is an act to prevent fraud in con-
sumer transactions. Furthermore, the MCPA provides a replevin remedy for the
successful plaintiff. OKS asserted both the inapplicability of the RICO action and
to intervene as a plaintiff.
141. Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 797 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (1994).
To establish a RICO claim, the plaintiff must allege at least to statutorily define predicate acts,
and he must show that the acts "are related, and that they amount to, or pose a threat of continued
activity." 797 F. Supp. at 67. (quoting HJ., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239
(1989)).
Also it was not "necessary to decide whether the acts complained of 'amounted to' a continued
criminal activity, because the 'pose a threat of continued criminal activity' prong was satisfied." 797
F. Supp. at 67.
143. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § l(a) (West 1994).
144. See supra note 142.
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a timeliness defense against the MCPA action.
The district court of Massachusetts held that the plaintiff's allegations under a
RICO claim were enough to defeat a defense based on McClain (II)."45
McClain (II) held that unlawful exportation alone does not render an artifact as
stolen for two reasons. First, Turkey possessed a legal claim on all artifacts in
Asia Minor as early as 1906. " This satisfied the requirement that the artifact
must be stolen within the meaning of the plaintiff nation's laws. In Turkey, the
government has right of possession over all artifacts. 47 Second, Turkey's
claims did not rely on the National Stolen Properties Act, but on a RICO claim.
There, the requirements of a clear violation of the plaintiff's laws are not the
applicable standard to begin a RICO action.' The district court thus held that
Turkey's claim of injury due to the loss of the coins was sufficient to sustain the
RICO action. 49 Whether the Republic of Turkey will be successful in pursuing
the RICO claim remains to be seen as the issue has not yet been decided in any
court. However, a RICO action has been determined viable.
OKS then asserted a statute of limitations timeliness defense against the
plaintiff's claim under the MCPA. 5° Turkey counterargued that their case was
analogous to Autocephalous II, where the limitation discover rule was held to
begin once the plaintiff "discovered" his cause of action.'' The district court
held that the plaintiff's Autocephalous 11 analogy was acceptable.'52 Finally,
OKS asserted that the application of the MCPA to this case was unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause because it would likely lead to non-uniform treat-
ment of foreign commerce.'53 The district court found this argument irrelevant
145. McClain 11, 593 F.2d at 658.
146. This was a law inherited from the Sultanate during the later Ottoman Empire. For a review of
Ottoman and Turkish law, see generally Dr. Christian Rumpf, The Importance of Legislative History
Materials in the Interpretation of Statutes in Turkey, 19 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 267, 270
(1994).
147. Id.
148. OKS, 797 F. Supp. at 66.
149. Id. at 67. The court relied on Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358-59
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989). The complainant's allegation of injury to the
sovereign were adequate where it sought the return of "money, funds and properly belonging to Phil-
ippines and its people" which the defendant had improperly removed from the country. Id.
150. Id. at 69.
151. Id. at 69. "Discovered" connotes that the plaintiff learns enough facts to form a basis, which
must include the facts that (1) the works are being held by another, and (2) who, or at least where,
that other is. Id.
152. Id. The court held:
I agree with the Seventh Circuit's analysis [in Autocephalous I] and hold that Massachu-
setts law is in accord on this point. These allegations of the defendants' calculated, suc-
cessful effort to hide the existence, or at least the provenance, of the coins, if true, could
be enough for a jury to find that the facts were inherently unknowable to Turkey for pur-
poses of tolling the statute of limitations under either the unadorned discovery rule or the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment. Consequently, Turkey's common law claims cannot be
dismissed on statute of limitations grounds at this time.
Id. (emphasis added)
153. Id.; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
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because there was only a minimal impact on foreign commerce. 54 Thus,
Autocephalous II's impact in the cultural property forum was felt directly in the
dismissal of the standard limitations defense, and indirectly by reinterpreting a
Massachusetts law against consumer fraud which has replevin as a possible rem-
edy.
2. Erisoty v. Rizik
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held in Erisoty v.
Rizik ' that a thirty year lapse of time will not, in and of itself, constitute a
statute of limitations bar to a claim. The facts of this case differ from both
Autocephalous II and OKS in that the inheritors of a private collector, rather than
a sovereign entity, were seeking the return of a potential cultural property. How-
ever, both the Autocephalous II and OKS courts held for the original owners'
position.
The facts of Erisoty are interesting. In 1940, Ayoub Rizik, an art collector,
and his wife, acquired four Corrado Giaquinto paintings titled "Winter, Spring,
Summer, and Autumn."'56 In 1960, these paintings were stolen from the Rizik's
home in Washington, D.C. The theft was reported to both the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and INTERPOL, the international police agency. The Riziks
had also notified the Art Dealers Association of America and the International
Foundation for Art Research (IFAR). Shortly after the theft, the Riziks died,
leaving their two children, Philip and Jacqueline Rizik, the stolen paintings,
should they ever be recovered. Furthermore, the children had been reimbursed by
their parent's insurance company. Some efforts at recovery were made, but as
time went on, the chances of recovery became less likely.
In 1988, a removal service discovered one of the paintings, titled "Winter,"
behind the drywall in an apartment slated for destruction.'57 After a series of
verifications, the painting was auctioned to Steven Erisoty who, through diligent
efforts, restored it. Eventually, the FBI was informed of Erisoty's possession.
The FBI then seized the painting and returned it to Rizik. Erisoty then com-
menced a suit for the return of the painting.
Of the many issues that arose, the most salient was whether the Rizik's efforts
to locate the painting were sufficiently reasonable to "toll the statute of limita-
tions."' s That the Riziks were neither art collectors nor part of the art commu-
nity was held irrelevant.'59 It was further held that Erisoty could not claim that
the Riziks had transferred title to their insurance company after it reimbursed
them for the loss in 1960." The district court held that the statute of limita-
154. OKS, 797 F. Supp. at 68.
155. Erisoty v. Rizik, No. 63-6215, 1995 WL 91406 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1995).
156. Giaquinto (1703-1763) was an Italian "pre-impressionist school" artist who specialized in
painting seasonal landscapes.
157. Erisoty, 1995 WL 91406 at *3. The painting titled "Winter" was in extremely poor shape as it
was cut into several pieces.
158. Id. at *8.
159. Id. at *9.
160. Id. (stating"... the Riziks had a continuing interest in the painting sufficient to warrant
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tions may be tolled for the Rizik's claim of ownership.' 6' The court applied a
weight-effort test to determine if the original owner had met the burden neces-
sary to "toll" the statute: "[w]ith respect to jewelry of moderate value, it may be
sufficient if the owner reports the theft to the police. With respect to art work of
greater value, it may be more reasonable to expect the owner to do more."'62
The court held that the discovery rule under these conditions "is highly fact
sensitive. '  Thus, the court will examine recovery efforts on a case-by-case
basis. In the case of Erisoty, the court held that the Riziks exercised enough due
diligence to toll the statute of limitations in their favor. The district court noted
that a case-by-case scheme "permits the court to consider the relative qualities of
the rival claimants to the art work.""' However, despite the court's consider-
ation of the "relative qualities" of the rival claims, it remains clear that the bal-
ance in any such consideration tips in favor of the original owner. Furthermore,
it remains clear that the unreasonable length defense is easily overcome by prov-
ing that the delay by the plaintiff was not intentional, but rather circumstantial.
CONCLUSION
Autocephalous 11 not only provides guidance to a plaintiff seeking recovery of
cultural property, but also illuminates three fundamental aspects of cultural prop-
erty law. First, statute of limitations defenses in cultural property cases are unus-
able under most circumstances. It would take an intentional delay by the party
seeking recovery to provide the possessor (whether the possessor is a museum or
individual) with a defense of unreasonable delay. Second, it remains clear that
the balance in any cultural property consideration tips in favor of the original
owner. This favoritism exists because it is presumed that the original owner was
also once the rightful owner. This remains true even if the original owner was
without actual possession for a considerable period of time. Finally,
consideration of their efforts under the due diligence criteria of the discovery rule.").
161. Id. at *10. (holding that the toll may occur," ... if strict enforcement would work an injus-
tice on victims of a tort or crime, such as where an original owner is unable to locate stolen art work
for many years despite reasonable search efforts.").
162. Id. at *12. (quoting O'Keefe, 416 A.2d 862, 873 (1980)). The court in Erisoty then quoted the
Autocephalous 11 holding, "that any laziness this rule might at first blush invite on the part of the
plaintiff is heavily tempered by the requirement that, all the while, the plaintiff must exercise due
diligence to investigate the theft and recover the works." Id. (quoting Autocephalous II, 917 F.2d
278, 289 (7th Cir. (1990)).
163. Id. John G. Petrovich, cited by the court, suggests a five part balancing test to apply the dis-
covery rule:
All relevant factors should be considered including, but not limited to, the following: (1)
the nature of the injury; (2) the availability and quality of the witnesses and physical evi-
dence; (3) the lapse of time since the initial wrongful act; (4) whether the circumstances
permit the inference that the delay has been intentional or deliberate; and (5) whether the
delay has unusually prejudiced the defendant.
John G. Petrovich, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings, Statues, and Statutes of Limitations, 27
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1122, 1152 (1980).
164. Erisoty, 1995 WL 91406 at *12.
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Autocephalous II proves that replevin is a more viable option than the cumber-
some federal statutes examined in Section II of this article. Under the replevin
doctrines of most states, it may be the case that sovereign entities whether for-
eign nations, Indian Tribes or recognized ethnic groups residing in the United
States have greater redress using state statues than federal protections. Replevin
actions by their very nature can be accomplished more efficiently and cheaper
than suits brought under the many available federal laws listed in Section II.
Furthermore, replevin laws, as seen in Autocephalous II, tend to favor the party
of original ownership, while the federal laws are on the brink of devolution
against the party of original ownership.
Though the drawback to replevin is that an absolute constitutional right has
not been established, such as in a suit brought under AIRFA or NAGPRA for
example, the return of ownership and a legal right, however, have been estab-
lished. Moreover, as the examination of the AIRFA, NAGPRA, and ARPA has
illuminated, the courts are sometimes unwilling to find asserted constitutional
rights for the plaintiff. Unless the plaintiff party desires to reassert a constitution-
al or federal right, then replevin is the more viable option.
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